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Abstract  
The success of construction projects is highly dependent on the coordination of a fairly large 
number of stakeholders, such as client organizations, designers, general contractors, and 
subcontractors. Each of those stakeholders can both affect and be affected by the way a 
project is managed, and none of them usually has the power or the ability to coordinate 
project supply chains. However, there is no comprehensive theoretical foundation for 
describing or explaining the coordination of construction project supply chains. This paper 
discusses the role of three different theoretical perspectives for understanding the inter-firm 
coordination process of project supply chains in the construction industry: the Theory of 
Coordination, the Transaction Cost Theory and the Language-Action Perspective. Although 
the combined use of theoretical approaches has been suggested in the literature, an in-
depth discussion on how they complement each other, based on empirical data, seems to be 
necessary. The contribution of each theoretical approach is pointed out in the paper, and 
their complementary role is illustrated in a case study carried out in a petrochemical 
construction project in Brazil. 
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Introduction  
In spite of the attention that supply chain management (SCM) has attracted among 
practitioners and researchers, the translation of its concepts, practices and techniques into 
the construction industry is still a challenging issue, mostly due to differences that exist 
between this sector and other industries (O'Brien et al., 2004). SCM originated in industries 
where demand is predictable, requirements for variety are limited, and volume is high 
(Christopher, 2000). Most contemporary academic work in this field is concerned with high 
volume industries, where a large-scale (hence economically powerful) manufacturer is 
supported by smaller (economically weaker) suppliers or subcontractors, based on long-term 
relationships (Bresnen, 1996). In fact, it is often assumed that a single company is capable 
of controlling and even designing its supply chain. 
 
By contrast, construction project supply chains are essentially temporary multi-organizations 
that are set up with the specific purpose of delivering a construction project. Such supply 
chains arise at the start of the project, develop, and finally disband as the end of it (Cherns 
and Bryant, 1984). In such supply chains, inter-firm coordination is a complex task, due to 
both the large number of firms involved and the lack of knowledge about their individual 
behavior (Grandori, 1997). Each of those stakeholders can both affect and be affected by 
the way a project is managed, and none of them usually has the power or the ability to 
coordinate project supply chains. 
 
Much of the research on construction SCM has addressed the problem of describing 
construction supply chains or explaining how they are actually managed (O'Brien et al., 
2004).  One of the difficulties faced by researchers on this task is that distinct and 
sometimes disconnected theoretical approaches have been proposed for understanding 
SCM. Each perspective usually considers only a particular and limited aspect of supply chain 
 
Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building 
 
 
Isatto, E L and Formoso, C T (2011) ‘Three theoretical perspectives for understanding inter-firm coordination of 
construction project supply chains’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building, 11 (3) 1-17  
2 
management, thus not being capable of providing a comprehensive description of their 
structure, nor an adequate explanation of their behavior (Croom et al., 2000; Tan, 2001). 
 
While such a diversity of perspectives may be a remarkable characteristic of novel fields of 
research, a movement of convergence is expected to occur as those fields evolve and 
mature (Kuhn, 1962). Indeed, in recent years the simultaneous use of multiple theoretical 
approaches has been suggested as a means to provide a more complete understanding of 
construction supply chains. O'Brien, London and Vrijhoef (2004) have proposed an 
interdisciplinary research agenda for construction SCM that combines elements of 
operations management, analytic modeling, and industrial organization theory, while 
Vrijhoef, Koskela and Voordijk (2003) have identified Transaction Cost Theory, Operations 
Management, Language/Action Perspective, and Network Theory as potential candidates for 
devising a comprehensive theoretical framework for this field. However, those papers have 
simply suggested the combined use of sets of theoretical approaches. None of them has 
made an in-depth discussion on how they complement each other, based on empirical data. 
  
This paper discusses the limited role of three different theoretical perspectives for 
understanding the inter-firm coordination process of project supply chains in the construction 
industry: the Theory of Coordination (TC), the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) and the 
Language-action Perspective (LAP). These approaches are discussed in the paper, and their 
limitations and complementarities are illustrated in the description of a case study carried out in a 
petrochemical construction project in Brazil. 
 
Theoretical Approaches for Inter-firm Coordination  
Core Dimensions of Inter-firm Coordination  
According to Stadtler (2005), supply chain management involves the coordination of three 
main flows: materials, information and financial flows.  Value (or product) flows are often 
regarded as the main purpose of supply chains since they are the means by which value is 
generated and delivered to the customers (Johnston, 1995; Ballou et al., 2000). They usually 
comprise the flows of materials or components being processed, but may also include 
information, since most products are a combination of physical goods and services. The role 
of financial flows is to support the cooperation that is necessary for the production flows to 
occur between supply chain members (Stadtler, 2005). 
 
Dimension Flow type Purpose Main problem addressed 
Production Products 
(materials and 
information) 
Deliver value to the 
client 
Coordinate the flow of products (goods 
or services) among supply chain 
members 
Economic Financial Achieve and sustain 
cooperation among 
supply chain 
members 
Coordinate transactions (exchanges) 
between supply chain members by 
incentive alignment 
Social Information (for 
coordination) 
Coordinate actions 
among autonomous 
actors 
Coordinate the collective action of 
supply chain members 
Table 1 The three dimensions of inter-organizational coordination of supply chains 
 
In situations that involve discrete transactions, understanding value and financial flows may 
be enough, since the exchange between money and products are easy to evaluate (Macneil, 
1978). However, most exchanges in construction projects are not so simple, demanding an 
intense coordination effort among supply chain members. This places the flow of information 
as one of the pivotal elements to promote the coordination of the collective action among 
supply chain members (Winograd and Flores, 1985; Crowston, 1991; Denning and Medina-
Mora, 1995; Ballou et al, 2000), both by triggering their action as well as by creating a 
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common background among people and organizations that is vital for mutual understanding 
(Winograd and Flores, 1985). 
 
Therefore, each of those flows encompasses a specific purpose that should be considered in 
order to describe the coordination among supply chain members. Each one defines a distinct 
and important dimension of inter-firm coordination: the production, the economic and the 
social dimensions (Table 1). 
 
Production Dimension: The Theory of Coordination  
The production dimension is concerned with both the definition of the necessary tasks to be 
carried out in the project and the further assignment of those tasks among supply chain 
members, and the definition of the means to be used to coordinate the dependences among 
those members. While in other industries those actions occur only a limited number of times, 
they are much more important in construction due to the unique and temporary nature of 
project supply chains. The Theory of Coordination (TC), originally proposed by Crowston 
(1991), and built mostly on the work of March and Simon (1958) and Thompson (1967), is 
particularly suitable for understanding this dimension. 
 
March and Simon (1958) suggested two forms of specialization to guide the process of task 
decomposition and assignment: (a) specialization by process, grouping people that know 
only a particular process (e.g. engineering, design, procurement); and (b) specialization by 
purpose, grouping people that work only in a particular part of the product (e.g. sub-
contractors that work in the same stage of the project). Thompson (1967) proposed a 
framework to bridge each type of interdependence (pooled, sequential and combined) and 
the most appropriate solution in terms of coordination mechanisms (standardization, rules or 
mutual adjustment) (see Table 2). 
 
 Kind of interdependence Coordination mechanism 
 Pooles: 
each actor contributes to and 
depend on the whole 
 
Standardization and rules 
 Sequential: 
one actor depends on another 
Plans 
 Reciprocal: 
the outputs of one actor are the 
inputs of the other and vice versa 
 
Mutual adjustment and teams 
Table 2 Kinds of interdependence and coordination mechanisms (based on Thompson, 1967) 
 
TC aims to understand why coordination is necessary and how coordination is actually 
achieved. According to Malone and Crowston (1994), coordination is “the act of managing 
dependences among activities”, involving the design and implementation of specific tasks 
aimed at this purpose. TC proposes that such tasks can be generalized in the form of 
coordination methods that are able to solve specific coordination problems, and that 
adequate coordination methods exist for every kind of coordination problem (Crowston, 
1991). Distinct kinds of coordination problems may arise according to the kind of task-
resource dependence that is involved, as shown in Table 3. 
 
There are some clear connections between the Theory of Coordination and the framework 
proposed by Thompson (1967). Whereas sequential interdependences arise from flow 
dependences of multiple tasks that use or create a non-shareable resource, pooled 
interdependences occur when multiple tasks use or create the same shareable and reusable 
resources. By contrast, reciprocal interdependences cannot be easily modeled, making it 
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necessary to adopt the coordination mechanism of mutual adjustment and teams, since 
standardization, rules and plans tend to be ineffective in those situations. 
 
Type of task-resource dependence Coordination problems 
Flow dependence (one task uses a 
resource created by another) 
Resources must be made available by one task when it 
is needed by another (prerequisite condition) 
Quality of resources must be adequate for use (usability 
condition) 
Resources must be available at the right place 
(availability) 
Multiple tasks create the same 
resource 
Shareable resources: eliminate redundant efforts or 
negotiate the object, choosing the best one 
Non shareable and reusable resources: combine the 
outcomes of the tasks (integrate) 
Non-shareable and consumable resources: select one or 
seek economies of scale by merging tasks 
Multiple tasks use the same resource Shareable resources: no conflict arises 
Non-shareable and reusable resources: schedule use of 
resources 
Non-shareable and consumable resources: favour one 
task instead of another 
Task-subtask dependence Create and assign sub-tasks 
Manage dependences among sub-tasks 
Assure that sub-tasks include all the content of the 
original task (i.e. nothing if left unassigned) 
Table 3 Types of dependences and corresponding coordination problems (based on Crowston, 
1991 and Crowston and Osborn, 1995) 
 
Therefore, the effects of task decomposition on the dependences between subtasks play an 
important role in framing the TC into a dynamic context, as the process of task 
decomposition and assignment can be itself highly dynamic. If subtasks are well known in 
advance, it is possible to create a plan for performing the task, while a more adaptive 
process is required when there is more uncertainty about the subtasks to be carried out 
(Crowston, 1991). 
 
As tasks are decomposed into subtasks and assigned to different actors, new dependences 
will arise (Crownston, 1991). The choice of a specific type of specialization can greatly affect 
the need for further coordination. It is expected that the specialization by process will 
generate flow dependences among actors because each actor is responsible for a single 
part of the whole process, and specialization by purpose will demand a greater use or 
creation of common resources. 
 
A serious limitation of TC is that it assumes that actors are essentially cooperative, i.e. there 
are usually no conflicts between their goals and, when asked to do something, they do it 
(Crowston, 1991). This greatly constrains its application to inter-organizational contexts. 
While the motivation for cooperation in an inter-organizational context is largely affected by 
the possibility of achieving economic benefits, this cannot be considered as the only relevant 
factor for cooperation among firms, since “cooperation is jointly determined by social factors 
and incentive alignment” (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Economic Dimension: The Transaction Cost Theory  
The problem of governance is particularly relevant in the case of a construction project 
supply chain, as it relies on the establishment of contractual relationships that may not be 
recurrent, thus affecting the willingness of its members to cooperate (Axelrod, 2000). 
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Moreover, contracting costs tend to be affected by uncertainty and the degree of asset 
specificity that is involved in a project. 
 
The first step to bridge economic and behavioural aspects was made by Ronald Coase in 
1937 by proposing the Transaction Cost Theory1 (TCT), which was further extended by 
Williamson (1985). It was successfully used by Winch (2001) as a conceptual framework to 
analyze construction supply chains, particularly for explaining the governance of the 
construction projects. 
 
TCT is based on two main assumptions: (a) economic transactions occur in a context 
characterized by the presence of opportunism – “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1985); and (b) human agents are subject to bounded rationality2  – their 
behaviour is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). Therefore, it is 
not possible to anticipate all problems that can arise in a contract, being necessary to devise 
a governance structure to avoid or to solve occasional disputes in the execution of a 
contract. 
 
According to Williamson (1985), the frequency of transactions (recurrent or occasional) and 
the degree of asset speciﬁcity involved (non-speciﬁc, mixed or idiosyncratic) are the features 
that will dictate the most adequate governance structure to be adopted for the transaction in 
terms of minimizing overall transaction costs (Table 4). In transactions that involve non-
specific assets, the market (classical contracting) tends to be the most adequate governance 
form. By contrast, highly idiosyncratic and recurrent transactions should be governed by a 
unified governance (i.e. inside the firm). In between there is a continuum of governance 
structures, such as trilateral governance (neoclassical contracting) and bilateral governance 
(relational contracting) (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Frequency 
Investment characteristics 
Non specific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Occasional 
Market governance 
(classical contracting) 
Trilateral governance 
(neoclassical contracting) 
Trilateral governance 
(neoclassical contracting) 
or Unified governance 
Recurrent 
Market governance 
(classical contracting) 
Bilateral governance 
(relational contracting) 
Unified governance 
Table 4 Alternative governance structures (based on Williamson, 1985) 
 
Classical contracting explicitly recognizes the possibility of an opportunistic behavior from 
the other party, but does not take into consideration the presence of bounded rationality. 
These assumptions are reasonable in the context of non-specific assets (commodities), in 
which the number of possible alternatives for the other party is very large, or in situations 
characterizes by low level of uncertainty. In both situations, the effects of bounded rationality 
are not expressive, and then tends not to affect contract execution. 
 
By contrast, relational contracting explicitly assumes the presence of bounded rationality, 
and relies on mutual adjustment to overcome its effects. It often reveals to be the most 
                                               
1
 It is also known as Transaction Cost Economics 
2
 The concept of bounded rationality has been coined by Simon (1961) to refer to the limitations of 
rational decision-making, based on the assumption that the ability for an individual to make a 
completely rational decision is always limited by the information that is accessible, the finite 
amount of time available, and cognitive limitations of the human mind. An interesting discussion 
about the subtleties and limitations on the concept of bounded rationality can be found in 
Gigerenzer and Selten (2001). 
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adequate governance structure in situations characterized by recurring transactions that are 
supported by investments of mixed kind, since the recurrence of transactions justifies the 
existence of a highly specialized governance structure. In such situations, long-term 
relationships are driven by trust and mutual interest, and opportunism is assumed to be 
absent (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, original agreement often looses its importance as the 
main reference for the relationship, as new rules and practices are mutually agreed by both 
parties during contract execution, and the relationship tends to evolve towards partnering as 
opportunistic behavior from the other party becomes less probable due to the frequency of 
the transactions and the possibility of new ones (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
However, neither classical nor relational contracting is able to cope with both opportunism 
and bounded rationality. In those situations, the neoclassical contracting scheme (trilateral 
contracting) arises as an adequate governance structure, since a third-party assistance 
(arbitration) is introduced for resolving disputes and evaluating performance (Williamson, 
1985).  
 
The relevance of the TCT for explaining the economic coordination of construction project 
supply chains arise from the fact that most of the linkages that tie firms together are 
contracts. Additionally, whereas the classical contracting (market governance) is adopted in 
most of the situations, this is usually due to unawareness of uncertainty and the possibility of 
opportunistic actions by the other part, as well as the wrong assumption that justice is fast, 
cheap and reliable enough to enforce contract execution through its completion (Williamson, 
1985). 
 
Social Dimension: The Language-Action Perspective  
Once the contractual relationships are established, there is a need to manage the collective 
work by coordinating the actions of supply chain members. Task subdivision, their 
assignments to individuals, and the subsequent coordination of dependences among them 
can only in part solve the coordination problem. However, as tasks are fragmented in a more 
detailed level of subdivision, complexity increases, and so the effects of bounded rationality. 
Subtasks and dependences are difficult to anticipate in advance. As a result, neither TC nor 
TCT are able to explain how the collaboration among the members of supply chain actually 
happens in such context, especially when high degrees of interdependence and autonomy 
exist, such as in most construction projects. Håkansson and Ford (2003) point out that, in 
those situations, the deliberate approach for coordinating supply chains often shows to be 
ineffective, as the behavior of the supply chain cannot be induced or anticipated by a single 
company but rather is the result of simultaneous and parallel actions of their members (Choi 
et al., 2001). 
 
In this context, the Language-Action Perspective (LAP), proposed by Flores (1982), arises 
as a promising theoretical framework for dealing with the social dimension of supply chain 
coordination. In fact, it has been argued that LAP can be successfully used for explaining the 
management of commitments in production planning and control in the construction industry 
(Vrijhoef et al., 2001; Macomber and Howell, 2003). 
 
Flores (1982) pointed out that language can be used to create a mutual orientation among 
different actors, in a kind of social action which, in turn, results in changes in the real world: 
“when we speak we engage in commitments, which in turn generate action”. In opposition to 
the rationalistic tradition that takes language as a representation – a carrier of information, 
Winograd and Flores (1986) suggests that language can also acts as a vehicle for requests 
and commissives, directed towards explicit cooperative action. This kind of performative 
conversation (and the resulting commitments) relies on a “consensual domain”, which is the 
result of informative conversation, i.e. the exchange of knowledge, and that creates a 
common background that assures meaning to the language. In spite of the fact that both 
kinds of conversation – performative and informative – are equally important and 
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complementary, the Language-Action Perspective focuses explicitly on the language for 
action. 
 
As a consequence, information systems can be understood at a more abstract level, where 
the flow of information arises to support commitments that must be set up and coordinated in 
order to generate desired actions (Flores, 1982; Winograd and Flores, 1986; van Reijswoud 
and Dietz, 1999). Thus, the effective coordination of actions can be considered as the same 
as the effective management of commitments, and the work progress can be traced by 
watching speech acts in the communications of those coordinating (Flores, 1982). 
 
Denning and Medina-Mora (1995) suggest that commitments can be viewed as workflow 
loops in which one party (the performer) promises to satisfy a request of the other (the 
customer). Every loop is made of four phases, and the completion of each phase occurs by 
the utterance of a specific kind of sentence by the performer or the customer (Figure 1). In 
the request phase, the customer makes a request to the performer or accepts an offer made 
by the performer (“I request”). The negotiation phase occurs when the customer and 
performer negotiate on the conditions that will satisfy the customer, culminating in the 
performer's promise (implied contract) to fulfill those conditions (“I promise”). Then the 
performance phase follows, in which the performer does the work and ends by declaring that 
it is done (“I am done”). The loop ends with the satisfaction phase, in which the customer 
accepts the work and declares satisfaction. Satisfaction means that the implied contract has 
been fulfilled; it means neither gratification nor a psychological report about the customer (“I 
am satisfied”).  
 
 
Figure 1 The commitment loop (adapted from Denning and Medina-Mora, 1995) 
 
However, the incompleteness of commitment loops cannot be regarded as the causes for 
breakdowns. The way commitment loops are interconnected to form business processes 
also play an important role in coordinating actions. In fact, every organization can be 
depicted as a map of interconnected commitment loops, which can be used for designing 
work processes and supporting information technologies, managing commitments up to 
completion, and measuring productivity in order to avoid breakdowns (Flores, 1982). Thus, 
the effectiveness of the coordination of collective action relies both on the completeness of 
commitment loops and on the structure of business processes as a chain of interconnected 
commitment loops. 
 
Research Method  
Two descriptive case studies were carried out in different projects of the same general 
contractor. This company had been mainly involved in industrial, commercial, and health 
care projects for private clients. Those projects usually had a high level of complexity, 
according to the definition proposed by Williams (1999): there was a very large number of 
tasks and interdependences, and uncertainty was very high, mostly due to the overlapping 
between design and production stages. The role of the company in those projects was both 
carrying out construction activities and partially coordinating the design process. It was the 
main connection between the main project stakeholders: owner, most designers, and 
subcontractors. For that reason, it was considered in this investigation as the focal company 
of the project supply chain. As suggested by Lambert and Cooper (2000), choosing a focal 
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company is necessary in order to define which members of the supply chain should receive 
managerial attention and resources. 
 
In this article, one case study was chosen to illustrate the limitations and complementarities 
of the three theoretical approaches for understanding project supply chain. This project 
consisted of the design and construction of a new laboratory (1607 m²) and the 
refurbishment of an existing one (832 m²) for a petrochemical company, in the South of 
Brazil. There were clearly two different stages in the project, regarding the coordination 
process: (a) in the first eight weeks, the supply chain members worked mostly according to 
the coordination assumptions and coordination structure that was initially established; and 
(b) after facing several coordination problems, some important changes were introduced in 
the coordination process. The duration of the case study was 8 months. 
 
The aim of this case study was to understand how the coordination of the construction 
project supply chain was carried out, using the three theoretical approaches described in the 
previous section. Table 6 presents a set of descriptive factors that were used for guiding 
data collection, and the multiple sources of evidence that were used. 
 
Illustrative Case Study 
Phase 1 
Three departments of the client organization were directly involved in the project: the 
marketing department, as the main user of the facilities; the maintenance department, 
responsible for maintaining the facilities; and the financial department, the main decision 
makers in terms of capital investment. The client organization adopted the strategy of 
specialization by process, breaking down the project (“installing a lab”) into three major sub-
tasks: “design lab”, “build lab” and “install equipment” (Figure 2). They were assigned to the 
architect, the GC and the maintenance department, respectively. Thus, the task-resource 
dependences that arose were mainly of the flow type. The intention of the client company 
was to coordinate the information flow about user requirements and architectural design 
definitions. Design coordination meetings were considered to be necessary to assure that 
such information was properly passed on to the design team.  
 
By contrast, the GC decided to break down the overall task of designing and producing 
subsystems, adopting the strategy of specialization by purpose. Each subsystem was 
assigned to a different specialty subcontractor (Figure 2). The intention behind that strategy 
was to simplify the coordination among design and production for the main subsystems (e.g. 
foundations, HVAC, and precast concrete structure) by delegating that kind of coordination 
to different subcontractors. However, the general contractor kept the role of coordinating the 
work of all specialty subcontractors, being responsible for coordinating the information flow 
of architectural decisions to subcontractors, as well as the flow dependences among the 
sub-systems on site. That situation posed a new coordination problem since the tasks to be 
carried out by distinct designers were supposed to be relying upon the same common 
resource (drawings and specifications), which were used and modified by each of them as a 
result of their individual work. 
  
The responsibility for coordinating the delivery of the building from the general contractor for 
the installation of equipment remained with the client, and would happen only after the final 
delivery of the building. 
 
Even considering that most of the task assignments involved assets with a high degree of 
specificity, a classical contracting scheme (market governance) between the client and the 
GC was initially adopted, due the intention of the former to have strict control over the total 
cost of the project. This contract also established high penalties for project delays. By 
contrast, most of the contracts between the GC and some specialty subcontractors were far 
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more flexible, due to partnership relationships that they had in a number of previous projects. 
Bilateral governance structures (relational contracting) were adopted, as the decision of 
purchasing entire subsystems resulted in much less control over the process due to the high 
degree of specialization involved. Classical contracting was adopted by the GC for hiring a 
few labor-only subcontractors, to whom some minor works were assigned. 
 
Theoretical 
approach 
Descriptive factors Sources of evidence 
Theory of 
Coordination 
- Strategy for breaking down 
processes and assigning tasks to 
supply chain members  
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Analysis of long and short-term 
production plans (28 weeks), and design 
brief 
- Project extranet data and e-mails  
- Dependencies between supply 
chain members: types of task-
resource dependencies between 
members, coordination tasks, 
existing coordination problems 
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Project extranet data (8 weeks) and e-
mails  
- Structure of the coordination 
system: coordination mechanisms 
adopted, existing interactions 
between them, effectiveness in 
managing dependencies 
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Analysis of long, medium and short-
term production plans (28 weeks) 
- Project extranet data (8 weeks) and e-
mails 
Transaction Costs 
Theory 
- Characteristics of economic 
relationships: scope and 
characteristics of contracts, 
frequency of transactions between 
supply chain members, expectations 
of recurrent transactions between 
them. 
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Analysis of long and short-term 
production plans (28 weeks), and design 
brief 
- Project extranet data (8 weeks) and e-
mails 
- Other forms of governance: non-
contractual forms of governance 
adopted, supply chain members 
involved, effectiveness of those 
governance forms. 
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- E-mails  
 
Language-Action 
Perspective 
- Business processes: main 
transactions, connections between 
different commitment loops, actors 
involved, means of communication 
used.  
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Project extranet data (8 weeks) and e-
mails 
- Interruptions or conflict situations: 
main interruptions, frequency and 
causes of interruptions, processes 
affected, impacts on cooperation 
willingness and economic relations. 
- Participant observation in 28 medium-
term planning meetings, and in 9 design 
meetings 
- Analysis of long and short-term 
production plans (28 weeks), and design 
brief 
- Project extranet data (8 weeks) and e-
mails 
Table 6 Descriptive factors adopted and sources of evidence 
 
Note: project extranet data includes the number of accesses, frequency of document uploads and downloads, 
content of electronic documents and drawings 
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Figure 2 Decomposition of the project into subtasks and dependences between supply chain 
members 
 
The high specificity and idiosyncratic nature of the task of installing the lab equipment was 
the reason that led the client organization to assign it directly to an internal department, 
adopting a unified governance scheme. 
 
No regular meetings between the architect and subcontractors had been planned. It was 
expected that the architect would send the architectural definitions to the client according to 
an agreed plan, and client representatives would pass these to the GC, which were 
responsible for delivering those definitions to subcontractors and production crews. If it was 
necessary to coordinate the design of any subsystem and the architectural design, it was 
expected that a subcontractor would informally get in touch with the architect and ask for the 
necessary definitions. 
 
The coordination of actions among subcontractors on site was managed by the GC by using 
a production planning and control system that was strongly based on the Last Planner 
System (Ballard, 2000). One-week short term and one-month look-ahead (medium term) 
plans were produced in two separate weekly meetings, involving representatives of different 
production teams. The GC decided to carry out also weekly design coordination meetings, 
involving members of both production and design teams (including the architect and client 
representatives), aiming to pass on requests for design definitions to the design team, in 
order to synchronize design and production inter-related tasks. Such meetings had also the 
role of enabling conversations among subcontractors regarding the coordination of the 
design of different subsystems, not only in terms of establishing the necessary commitments 
of stakeholders but also making compatible sets of design decisions. 
  
The flow of architectural definitions between design and production teams was initially 
planned to be pushed by the former to the latter. However, as soon as the project started, 
the client marketing and maintenance departments noticed that some requirements had not 
been properly considered in the architectural outline design, causing delays in the design 
process and disruptions in production activities. Consequently, the primary concern of 
design meetings shifted from the delivery of architectural definitions to the identification of 
the production needs (e.g. the definition of drawings that needed to be delivered first) and to 
establish deadlines for the delivery of those design definitions by the architect, which 
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resulted in a system of pull coordination between design and production. The size of the 
batches of design information that were transferred between the members had to be 
reduced in order to speed up the design process, thus increasing the flow of information 
between them. 
 
After eight weeks, the project was at risk of serious delay or even complete interruption due 
to the lack of design definitions, poor coordination among project members, and conflicts 
between the client and the GC about the project scope and budget. Such difficulties in 
managing the design process indicated that the adopted contracting scheme was not the 
most appropriate for that context. The agreement between the client and the general 
contractor was very rigid in terms of ex-post adaptation. The need for approval of every 
change by both the client and the GC, plus the need for additional negotiation about the 
scope of contracts have slowed down the speed of the design processes and increased the 
risk of project delays. Even the high flexibility of the contracts between the general contractor 
and the subcontractors was not enough to shield those relationships against the effects of 
the conflicts between the GC and the client. 
  
In spite of those problems, the highly specific nature of the object of the contract made it 
very difficult and expensive for any of the parties to interrupt the previous arrangement. As a 
consequence, the client and the GC agreed to set the original contract aside and to 
renegotiate previous conditions, taking into consideration the actual context. From one side, 
the client stopped introducing further changes in the design and delegated the management 
of the design process to the GC. In turn, the GC agreed with the establishment of a new 
deadline for project completion (January 2002). 
 
Phase 2  
After renegotiating the contract and freezing some design decisions, the overall governance 
structure of the project moved from the original classical (client – general contractor) and 
relational contracting (general contractor – subsystems contractors) schemes to a trilateral 
one, in which the product development team played the role of a third party in resolving 
disputes involving technical matters and evaluating performance of relationships between 
project supply chain members. That migration from two incompatible governance forms to a 
common governance structure is illustrated in Figure 3. The adoption of the trilateral 
governance represented an explicit recognition of the possibility of opportunism in the 
governance structure established to coordinate the relationships between the GC and 
subcontractors, and of the effect of bounded rationality on the governance structures set up 
to coordinate the relationships between the client and the GC, and between the client and 
the architect. 
 
  Opportunism 
  Present Absent 
Bounded 
rationality 
Present 
Trilateral contracting 
(project governance 
structure) 
Relational contracting 
(GC governance structure) 
Absent 
Classical contracting 
(client governance structure) 
 
Figure 3 Changes in the governance structure of the construction project supply chain 
 
Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building 
 
 
Isatto, E L and Formoso, C T (2011) ‘Three theoretical perspectives for understanding inter-firm coordination of 
construction project supply chains’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building, 11 (3) 1-17  
12 
As the design process became more complex and difficult to forecast in the long and 
medium term, design meetings became crucial for the coordination of the actions, since the 
management of short-term commitments turned out to be the most effective alternative to 
coordinate the design process and to negotiate changes in the product. This was effectively 
managed by using the Last Planner System, since there was a direct connection between 
look-ahead production plans and design weekly plans, prepared at the design coordination 
meetings. The constraints that were identified in the former had to be addressed in the latter. 
The dependences between subcontractors were managed mostly as they were using and 
generating common resources, since information concerned with client requirements and 
design definitions were used by most of the subsystem designers, and such definitions 
should be well integrated in the design of the whole product. 
 
Several actions were necessary to manage concurrent dependences. Firstly, the full 
attendance of designers, general contractor and client representatives to the weekly 
meetings was enforced in order to make it possible to establish the necessary commitments 
- more precisely, enabling the request, negotiation and satisfaction phases of commitment 
loops - and also to negotiate occasional conflicts concerned with design definitions. 
Secondly, the design team decided to exchange electronic versions of the drawings and 
documents, thus making the design definitions a shareable and reusable resource. Thirdly, a 
project extranet was set up to provide simultaneous access to that information for the design 
team. Fourthly, rules for naming and controlling different versions of production drawings 
were agreed among the design team, in order to assure the usability of the information to be 
exchanged among them. 
 
Figure 4 represents the network of commitments that was gradually built by the project 
supply chain. It represents an important change, since, at the start of the project, 
commitments were essentially embodied by the contracts, being aligned with the task-
subtask dependences. 
Production
Team
Design
Team Architect
Subcontractors
Product
definitions
P
ro
d
u
tio
n
p
la
n
s
S
ubsystem
s'
definitions
Architectural
definitions
Task Customer Performer
Production plans Production team Subcontractor
Product definitions Production team Design Team
Subsystems definition Design team Subcontractor
Architectural definition Design team Architect
 
Figure 4 Network of commitments among supply chain members 
 
Discussion  
The contribution of the Theory of Coordination for the analysis of inter-firm coordination is 
mainly related to the purpose of the supply chain in terms of delivering value to the 
customer, by addressing how tasks are decomposed and assigned to actors, which 
dependences arise as a consequence of the previous decisions, and how these 
dependences are managed. Due to the adaptive and dynamic nature of the construction 
project supply chains, many of these decisions had to be changed in the course of the 
project, as shown in Table 7.  
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Descriptive 
factors 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Strategy for 
breaking down 
processes 
 Client: specialization by process 
 GC: specialization by purpose 
 No change due to contractual 
bindings 
Dependencies 
between supply 
chain members 
 Task – sub-task dependencies: 
(a) Client-architect 
(b) Client-GC 
 No change due to contractual 
bindings 
 Main flow dependencies: 
(a) From Architect to Client 
(b) From Client to GC 
(c) From GC to Subcontractors 
 Main flow dependencies: 
(a) From Architect to GC 
(b) From GC to Architect 
(c) From Architect to Subcontractors 
(d) From Subcontractors to Architect 
(e) From Subcontractor to 
Subcontractor 
 Common resource dependencies: 
Among subcontractors 
 Common resource dependencies: 
Among Architect, GC and 
subcontractors  
Structure of the 
coordination 
system 
(coordination 
mechanisms) 
 Task – sub-task dependencies: 
Set up of milestones and deadlines 
(plans), and control of deliveries in 
regular design coordination 
meetings.  
 Task – sub-task dependencies: 
Sharing real-time information by 
using a project extranet, and design 
and production control through 
weekly short and medium-term 
planning meetings 
 Flow dependencies: 
Design information pushed from 
the architect to production teams 
 Flow dependencies: 
Design information pulled at design 
coordination weekly meetings based 
on the demands of production teams 
 Common resource dependences: 
Rules, standards and regular 
meetings. 
 Common resource dependences: 
Resources made shareable, rules, 
and the establishment of short-term 
(one-week) commitments 
Table 7 Project changes concerned with production coordination 
 
However, the assumption that actors are essentially cooperative and that no conflict exists 
between their goals (Crowston, 1991) greatly constrains the application of TC in the inter-
organizational context. The role of the Transaction Cost Theory resides exactly on 
approaching the coordination problem from such perspective, complementing TC by 
including both economic and behavioral aspects, particularly the ex post aspects of contracts 
and their effects over their ex ante aspects. 
 
By addressing the governance of the project supply chain, TCT points out the boundaries 
that limit the space in which cooperation between firms is expected to occur and how the 
contracts and other governance forms affect this. In the case study, the governance 
structures that were initially designed by the client and by GC could not cope with the both 
the effects of high levels of uncertainty and the presence of opportunism. The decision of the 
construction company in purchasing complete subsystems as engineered-to-order contracts 
had simplified to a great extent the task of coordinating the activities under its responsibility, 
since much of the complexity involved in the coordination of dependences between the 
design, production and installation of each subsystem was transferred to suppliers. 
However, there was a price for that decision, the loss of ability to coordinate directly much of 
the process, increasing its dependency on each supplier. This, in turn, resulted in exchanges 
that involve much more specific and complex assets, which, based on TCT, suggests the 
adoption of trilateral or bilateral governance structures. In fact, after some negotiations 
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between the client and the GC, the trilateral governance was informally adopted by the 
project supply chain (Table 8).  
 
Descriptive factors Phase 1 Phase 2 
Characteristics of 
economic relationships 
Client – Architect, Client – GC:  
 Occasional transaction involving 
highly specific assets 
 Contractual relationship was 
regarded as isolated from 
previous or future exchanges 
 Opportunism was anticipated 
assuming a foreseeable future 
(no uncertainty) 
GC – Subcontractors: 
 Recurrent transactions involving 
investments of mixed kind 
 Contractual relationships were 
regarded as a series of 
exchanges 
 Complexity and bounded 
rationality were expected to 
occur in a context of truth and 
mutual cooperation 
Client – Architect, Client – GC, 
GC – Subcontractors: 
 The notion of a project 
supply chain is supported 
by contractual 
relationships which 
recognize the mutual 
dependence among its 
members 
 Limits for changes were 
agreed by the client and 
GC in order to explicitly 
avoid opportunism 
 Design and production 
teams played the role of a 
third party forum for 
solving technical disputes 
Governance forms Client – Architect, Client – GC: 
 Classical contracting (market 
governance) 
GC – Subcontractors: 
 Relational contracting (bilateral 
governance) 
Client – Architect, Client – GC, 
GC – Subcontractors: 
 Trilateral governance, 
supported by informal 
adaptation of existing 
contracts 
Table 8 Project changes concerned with economic coordination 
 
The fact that governance structures usually grant some degree of freedom to the parties to 
act autonomously limits the application of TCT. As pointed out by Grandori (1997), in 
complex and dynamic environments, such as construction projects, the coordination problem 
is not limited to regulating exchanges or coordinating dependences among supply chain 
members, but it is also concerned with governing their collective action. A large number of 
micro-management decisions cannot be anticipated, and thus are usually left to the 
operational level in an adaptive manner in order to overcome the project uncertainty 
(Crowston, 1991; Grandori, 1997). 
 
Descriptive factors Project start Project end 
Completeness of 
commitment loops 
Lack of satisfaction with 
commitment loops  
Commitment loops completely 
fulfilled. 
Configuration of business 
processes as a network of 
commitments 
Commitment loops aligned with 
contracts (vertical coordination) 
Commitment loops aligned with 
flow dependences (horizontal 
coordination) 
Table 9 Project changes concerned with social coordination 
 
The main contribution of the Language/Action Perspective is to explain how managerial 
processes that occur in the inter-firm context are coordinated even when little control exists 
over the sequence and content of the activities. Additionally, LAP suggests how to manage 
the collective action of supply chain members within the space of possibilities that is limited 
by the same boundaries. In the case study, LAP explained how the Last Planner System 
was used to manage the collective action inside the space of possibilities of action delimited 
by governance structures, evidencing the imminence of breakdowns due to the 
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incompleteness of commitment loops or the poor connection of commitments. Table 9 
presents the main changes related to the social coordination of supply chain. 
 
Table 10 summarizes the contributions of each theoretical approach, emphasizing the 
complementarities that exist between them. The connection between TC and TCT relies on 
the idea of assignments that happen in the economic environment, bridging the gap between 
the coordination of production and economic flows. The combined use of LAP and TCT 
explains how coordination processes occur in the space of possibilities that is defined by 
contracts and other forms of governance that are responsible for defining the expected 
boundaries of cooperation among the firms. The connection between TC and LAP is clearly 
due to the fact that the commitment loops are essentially a coordination mechanism that is 
used to guarantee the accomplishment of a task. Nonetheless, their complementarities 
comes from the fact that the TC emphasizes the dependences among tasks and the way 
tasks are decomposed and assigned, and gives little attention to the design of the 
information system that will support the coordination, while the LAP focus precisely on the 
essential aspects related to information systems in order to coordinate actions among 
people through the management of commitments. Moreover, LAP also extends TC by 
including situations of execution by demand, in which individuals act in response to a 
demand of other individuals that depend on the outputs of their tasks. 
 
Relationship 
Role 
TCT TC LAP 
TCT and LAP 
TCT explains how to 
define a space of 
possibilities for 
decision-making 
through contracts and 
other governance 
structures. 
X 
LAP explains how to 
coordinate collective 
action in the space of 
possibilities defined by 
governance structures 
through the managed of 
commitments.  
TCT and TC 
TCT explains how to 
coordinate transactions 
among supply chain 
members by the 
management of their 
economic interests. 
TC explains how 
tasks must be 
decomposed and 
how to manage the 
connections 
(dependences) 
among them. 
X 
TC and LAP X 
TC explains how to 
define the outcomes 
of business 
processes and which 
tasks need to be 
performed 
collectively. 
LAP explains how to 
coordinate the execution 
of tasks among different 
stakeholders through the 
establishment of a 
network of commitments.  
Table 10 Complementarities between TC, TCT and LAP 
 
Conclusion  
This article has pointed the limitations and complementarities of three theoretical 
approaches in describing the inter-firm coordination of construction project supply chains. 
Based on the literature review, the Theory of Coordination, the Transaction Cost Theory, and 
the Language-Action Perspective were chosen for explaining inter-firm coordination from 
three different perspectives, which are related to the product, financial and information flows, 
respectively. 
 
The Theory of Coordination has been used to describe the organizational aspects of the 
supply chain, addressing the problem of coordination from the perspective of managing the 
resource dependences that occur between stakeholders. The Transaction Cost Theory helps 
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to understand how transactions frequency and asset specificity in a construction project can 
influence the most adequate kind of governance structure to be adopted in each situation, 
which greatly affect the cooperation among the members of the construction project supply 
chain. Finally, the Language-Action Perspective explains how cooperation can be 
maintained through the establishment and successful accomplishment of networked 
commitments among supply chain members, helping to analyze and design more 
appropriate information systems for managing construction project supply chains. 
  
The use of this set of theoretical approaches is especially valuable in complex construction 
projects. Considering that contracts are themselves broad commitments, as uncertainty and 
complexity rise, project managers face an increasing difficulty to coordinate the project 
supply chain only by managing contracts, which will in turn result in delegating a larger share 
of the coordination process to other stakeholders at operational levels. As individuals or 
firms are awarded more autonomy, the overall coordination burden grows, demanding 
organizational structures that are able to manage commitment loops in terms of their 
integrity and effective completion. 
 
The discussion on the role of three theoretical approaches, presented in this paper, 
represents an early step towards the development of a multiple theoretical framework in this 
field. Therefore, much work is still needed for developing a unified theory on the coordination 
of construction project supply chains. Further investigation on the underpinning assumptions 
of each theoretical approach is necessary, in order to assess to which extend they could 
form a unified theory. It is not clear yet if the three approaches are commensurable or 
whether they need to be commensurable and at what level. More work is also needed on 
establishing the boundaries of this set of theoretical approaches, in relation to other 
perspectives proposed in the literature. 
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